Introduction
The 1987 Palestinian Intifada marked a shift in the development of the Muslim Brotherhood in the occupied territories. The group’s participation in the intifada marked the beginning of the active political resurgence of Islamists in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the face of the Israeli occupation on the one hand, and the secular nationalist forces affiliated with the PLO on the other. As the intifada continued and the Muslim Brotherhood participated in it through the Islamist Resistance Movement (Hamas), which was created specifically to play this role, the balance of political power that had existed in Palestinian society for decades was disturbed. Perhaps for the first time since the Nakba of 1948, the Palestinian arena is witnessing the establishment of a political force with an ideology and political program that is different from the ideology of the dominant national trend and its political program. Today, this force enjoys public support that may be as strong in a number of locations in the occupied Palestinian territory, especially in the Gaza Strip, as the largest faction of the PLO is Fatah movement. One of the effects of this strategic shift in the balance of power in the occupied territories is that the current competition between the Islamic religious trend led by Hamas and the secular nationalist trend led by the PLO may not disappear with the end of the Israeli occupation, or after a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is reached, because this competition has become centered on the identity, direction and leadership of Palestinian society.
Background
The historical background of Hamas is the same as that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. Hamas’s charter states that “the Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine.” This position is consistent with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan’s view of Hamas, which sees Hamas as new only in its name, but it is not new in its ideology or leadership: “Hamas’ parent movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, has its roots in the Palestinian arena since many decades before the establishment of the usurping Zionist entity.” It is worth noting that since the mid-seventies, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood has been organizationally part of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.
Understanding Hamas’s historical background requires going back a bit to learn the historical background of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The parent group’s relationship with Palestine dates back to 1935, when Imam Hassan al-Banna, the group’s general guide in Egypt, sent his brother Abd al-Rahman al-Banna to visit Palestine. In 1945, the first branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was opened in Jerusalem. With the help of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, several branches of the group were opened in other Palestinian cities, reaching 1947 in 25. These branches, with membership ranging from 12,20 to 4,5 members, were overseen by the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Cairo. Haj Amin al-Husseini was named a local leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, and the use of the name mufti helped the Brotherhood spread its influence in the country.
After the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan in 1950, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite rule was essentially characterized by a great deal of understanding, although this relationship went through some manifestations of tension. The Brotherhood’s activity was not mostly political in nature, but rather concentrated in religious and social activity. In the Gaza Strip, which came under Egyptian administration until 1967, the Brotherhood’s relationship with this administration was often negative; the Brotherhood was persecuted and persecuted. The Muslim Brotherhood there had contributed to the failure of the North Sinai project aimed at settling Palestinian refugees in 1955, and the project to internationalize the Gaza Strip in 1957.
From the Israeli occupation in 1967 until the mid-seventies, the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in general was limited to religious and social matters, and was not of a clear or specific political nature. However, the decline of the struggle of the Palestinian national movement, in addition to some internal and external factors, especially the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, allowed the group to engage in significant political activity, especially on the campuses of Palestinian universities. This activity has focused mainly on countering the ideas and influence of the PLO’s national factions and countering the PLO’s secular approach. Only part of the group’s effort was devoted to confronting the Israeli occupation directly. However, the fundamental shift in the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood’s position occurred through the group’s participation in the 1987 intifada and the establishment of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which marked the involvement of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in the organized resistance to the Israeli occupation, for the first time since 1967.
Incorporation
The establishment of Hamas came in direct reaction to the outbreak of the intifada, and against the backdrop of research on how to deal with it and participate in it. The announcement of the formation of Hamas was preceded by a meeting held at the house of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin on 9 December 1987. In addition to Sheikh Yassin, the meeting was attended by six of the most prominent leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood-led Islamic Academy in Gaza. They are: Dr. Abdulaziz al-Rantisi (40 years old). He is a doctor from Khan Yunis, Dr. Ibrahim al-Yazuri (45), a pharmacist from Gaza, Sheikh Salah Shehadeh (40), an employee of the Islamic University of Gaza and a resident of Beit Hanoun, Engineer Issa al-Nashar (35), a resident of Rafah, Muhammad Sham’a (50), a teacher from al-Shati refugee camp, and ‘Abd al-Fattah Dukhan (50), a school principal and resident of Nuseirat camp. [6]
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to exploit an incident of 8 December 1987, in which a number of Palestinian workers from the Gaza Strip were killed in a collision between an Israeli truck and Arab vehicles carrying them. The discussion at this meeting revolved around the necessity and how to use this incident as a catalyst to stir up religious and national feelings and carry out mass protests.
On December 14, Brotherhood leaders in the Gaza Strip issued a statement calling on the people to stand up to the Israeli occupation. Hamas later retroactively considered this statement as the first call from the Islamic Resistance Movement.
While unrest, demonstrations and confrontations with the occupation forces continued in the Gaza Strip, and spread to the West Bank, and spread to the two areas, Sheikh Yassin and his colleagues continued the meetings, and the Brotherhood leaders coordinated with their counterparts in the West Bank. In January 1988, Sheikh Yassin commissioned a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank, Jamil Hamami, a young preacher at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, to work with colleagues on the establishment of a Hamas branch in the West Bank. Hammami formed a link between Sheikh Yassin and the Hamas leadership in the West Bank, as well as between Sheikh Yassin and the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which provided financial support for the intifada.
The establishment of Hamas came gradually, not as a result of a decision that preceded the intifada. It is noteworthy that the founders of Hamas in the West Bank are young Islamic leaders who preferred to engage in the intifada and participate in resisting the occupation without hesitation, unlike the traditional Brotherhood leaders, whose positions at the beginning of the intifada were characterized by caution and caution. After the intifada became a reality, and after the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in it was established through Hamas, all differences in attitudes towards the decision to participate in the intifada between Hamas’s young leaders and the traditional leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood disappeared.
Since the establishment of Hamas came against the backdrop of the intifada and the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in it, the group needed to find a formula for such participation, without endangering the parent organization. The Brotherhood, which had begun to enter a serious competition with PLO factions, could not stand aside and not participate in the uprising. On the other hand, it was not easy for the Brotherhood to justify its practical participation in confronting the occupation by suddenly engaging in the uprising on dynamic grounds in light of the group’s previous positions. Until the outbreak of the intifada, the Brotherhood adopted a position that the time had not yet come to engage in a confrontation with the occupation and declare jihad against it, because the Muslim Brotherhood was still in the stage of preparing and educating the Muslim generation that would lead the process of building an Islamic society as a prelude to declaring jihad against Israel.
On this basis, it can be assumed that the formation of Hamas came to provide a framework for taking responsibility for such a change in attitudes. If the intifada ends in failure, the Muslim Brotherhood will be able to evade responsibility and blame Hamas. If it continues, it will be easy for the Muslim Brotherhood to lend Hamas’s achievements to the group’s advantage. This is what happened when the Hamas charter declared the Islamic Resistance Movement a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The establishment of Hamas by the Muslim Brotherhood in the occupied territories was parallel to the establishment of the unified national leadership of the intifada by PLO factions, as the wing entrusted with direct participation in the resistance to the occupation needed a special name that distinguished it from the parent organization, at least in terms of the role assigned to it.
After Hamas gained great credibility as a result of its participation and role in the intifada, the name “Hamas” became the most common when referring to the Muslim Brotherhood in the occupied territories, which needed such credibility after the campaigns of skepticism it was subjected to by PLO factions as a result of the Brotherhood’s non-participation in the armed resistance to the Israeli occupation after 1967. Over time, Hamas and the Brotherhood have come to point out the same thing, even though Hamas now includes members and supporters who are not necessarily members of the Muslim Brotherhood either.
Objectives and Strategy
Hamas’ goals and strategy are inspired by the charter it issued on August 18, 1988, which includes the movement’s philosophy, raison d’être, and positions on various issues. The charter does not differ from the usual positions of the Muslim Brotherhood on all these issues. With regard to Hamas’ position on Palestine, the Charter states that “the land of Palestine is a land of Islamic endowment for generations of Muslims until the Day of Resurrection, and it is not permissible to give it up, part of it, or give it up or part of it… The solution to the Palestinian question, from Hamas’ point of view, is based on the removal of the State of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic State in its place. The Hamas charter speaks of three circles related to the issue of the liberation of Palestine: the Palestinian circle, the Arab circle and the Islamic circle, each of which plays its role in the struggle against Zionism.
Regarding peaceful solutions and international initiatives and conferences, the Hamas Charter says: “Initiatives, so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences to resolve the Palestinian issue contradict the doctrine of the Islamic Resistance Movement. And the patriotism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its religion. There is no solution to the Palestinian cause except through jihad. As for international initiatives, proposals and conferences, they are a waste of time, and an absurdity of absurdity, and the Palestinian people are too generous to tamper with their future, their right and their destiny.” Hamas therefore opposed Palestinian participation in the Madrid Peace Conference held in October 1991 and now opposes Palestinian participation in Arab-Israeli negotiations. Hamas calls on the Palestinian parties participating in these negotiations to withdraw immediately.
Hamas opposes the secular nature of the PLO and its leadership, as well as the PLO’s political program calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state living side by side with the State of Israel. Hamas has condemned the organization’s recognition of the existence of the State of Israel and its acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Although Hamas does not openly and explicitly object to the PLO being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in its competition with the PLO in leading the Palestinian people, rejecting the PLO’s political program, calling for the establishment of an Islamic society in Palestine, and demanding the establishment of an Islamic leadership for the Palestinian struggle, it effectively objects to the PLO’s representation of the Palestinian people and being the frame of reference for this people, which determines its identity and national goals.
Leadership
The first Hamas leadership consisted of the seven founding members led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. It later established leadership wings and committees in the political, security, military and media fields. From time to time, leadership bodies were reconstituted due to repeated arrests of the movement’s leaders. After Sheikh Ahmed Yassin’s arrest in May 1989 and his sentencing to 15 years in prison, Dr. Rantisi took the lead in the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip. Among the movement’s well-known leaders in the West Bank are Hussein O Kweik, a prominent trade unionist, Fadl Saleh, an imam at a mosque, and Hassan Yousef, also a teacher and mosque imam. All three are Hamas leaders and operatives who were expelled by Israel in December 1992. The nature of the relationship between the prominent Islamic preacher, Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, who was also expelled by Israel, with Hamas, is unknown. There are, of course, other Hamas leaders inside the occupied territory, but they are not public.
Outside the occupied territories, well-known names in the Hamas leadership include Musa Abu Marzouq, head of the movement’s political bureau, Ibrahim Ghosheh, the movement’s official spokesman, Muhammad Nazzal, its representative in Jordan, and Imad al-Alami, its representative in Tehran. There are other prominent but undeclared leaders who are present in a number of countries outside Palestine. Hamas is generally led by a Shura Council, whose members are inside and outside the occupied territory.
After five years of active participation in the intifada, Hamas was able to graduate successive batches of leadership cadres who led or practiced in field work, or who were placed in Israeli prisons and detention centers, or who were expelled from the country by the occupation forces. The December deportation emptied the occupied territory of most of the front-line leaders of Hamas and the parent Muslim Brotherhood. The deportation also included a large number of second- and third-line leaders, and a number of other activists. Today, the arena of occupied territory appears empty of prominent and well-known Islamist leaders.
But the removal of Hamas leaders may not affect the daily routine activities of the intifada. It may also not affect the leadership practice responsible for formulating strategic decisions, because the Hamas leadership in the occupied territories relied on advice and guidance from its leadership extensions abroad and from Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Jordan and Egypt. Armed actions carried out by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades may not be affected, as the Israeli authorities have failed to arrest the commanders or members of these brigades, which usually carry out individual armed actions.
It is likely that the leadership vacuum resulting from the deportation of Hamas leaders and activists to southern Lebanon will give way to the emergence of young hardline leaders who do not value political considerations, as is the case with a large number of expelled Islamist leaders, whose positions have been characterized by relative moderation as a result of their involvement in politics and their awareness of its requirements.
External Relations
Since its inception, Hamas has had close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which has provided Hamas with all forms of ideological, political, moral and material support. Hamas has also enjoyed the support of other Islamist movements in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, and others, and al-Jawali and Islamist organizations in the United States and European countries have supported Hamas since its founding.
After the outbreak of the intifada and Hamas’s participation in it, the relationship between the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and Iran improved somewhat. This positive change in attitude toward the Iranian government followed an improvement in Muslim Brotherhood relations in Jordan. Relations between Hamas and Iran improved further after the Gulf War, as Hamas was keen to find new allies after its relations with Islamist movements in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, as well as with the governments of those countries, worsened. After the rapprochement between Hamas and Iran, the group opened an office in Tehran now headed by one of Hamas’s well-known leaders, Imad alami.
Funding
Hamas relies on several sources for its funding, the most important of which are:
(1) Funds collected by the movement from its supporters, sympathizers, or the general public inside the occupied territory. These funds come in the form of zakat paid as an Islamic obligation, or donations or donations to help the poor and needy provided by benefactors to bodies or institutions supervised by Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood in the occupied territories. The Movement also receives donations or donations from the general public as a result of its efforts in the areas of reform, mediation and conflict resolution between the people. Most of the money from this source goes to help poor families, to the construction of mosques or kindergartens or to other charitable work. Therefore, many residents of the occupied territories, for moral, religious, and sometimes political motives, donate funds to the movement or to its zakat committees affiliated with or sympathetic.
(2) Funds received by the movement from unofficial sources outside Palestine. The movement’s supporters and friends abroad collect this money from Muslims in some Arab and Muslim countries, the United States and European countries. Just as Muslims in various parts of the world supported the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, today they provide financial support to the Mujahideen in Palestine. Islamic institutions, bodies and funds in several countries also provide material support to Muslims in Palestine through Hamas.
(3) Support issued by the World Islamic Movement, which includes Islamic movements in various countries, especially in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Sudan, Iran, and other countries. These movements provide financial support to Hamas out of Islamic brotherhood to support it in its resistance to the Israeli occupation. It also aims to provide material support to Hamas and the parent Muslim Brotherhood group to strengthen the position of the Islamist trend vis-à-vis secular forces in the occupied territories.
(4) Support from some countries sympathetic to Hamas. Despite assurances by the Hamas leadership that it does not receive any financial assistance from government sources, it is noteworthy in this context that the movement receives financial support from the governments of Saudi Arabia and some Gulf states, especially before the Gulf crisis. These governments reportedly continued to support Hamas after the Gulf War, wanting to punish the PLO for the PLO’s pro-Iraq stance. Providing such support to Hamas could also help their governments appease their Islamist movements. Iran is also providing tens of millions of dollars in financial support to Hamas. Iran also provides the group with other forms of support, such as military training for the group’s cadres in Iran itself, or at bases in Lebanon supervised by the pro-Iranian Hezbollah. It is worth mentioning that Hamas participated in the conference held in Tehran in 1991 to protest the convening of the Madrid peace conference and the Palestinian participation in Arab-Israeli negotiations.
(5) Support provided by the PLO. In the past, the organization’s leadership has provided financial support to Hamas at least once, at the behest of the organization’s president, Yasser Arafat;
(6) Investment projects of the movement. Although the Hamas leadership denies owning any investment projects that would bring the movement material income, it is possible to assume that the movement seeks to establish such investment projects, if it does not already own them, due to the increasing financial responsibilities of the movement with its size and needs increasing day by day. Several sources point to private investments in Hamas.
Thus, it is remarkable that Hamas receives financial support from various sources. It should be noted that the movement does not yet have a large or complex bureaucratic apparatus like the PLO’s, so the spending of the movement’s funds in this area is still limited. Hamas’s leadership and members are also known to be modest in its spending methods, far from extravagance, extravagance or financial corruption. Despite the importance of the availability of funding sources, it is a mistake to assume that Hamas derives its popularity from its financial capabilities, as these capabilities cannot yet be compared to the financial capabilities available to the PLO. However, it should also be noted that Hamas’ responsibilities are not as complex as those of the organization, which bears financial burdens in the occupied territories and the diaspora, while Hamas’ spending is concentrated in the occupied territories.
Social and political activity
Hamas’ social and political activity complements the Muslim Brotherhood’s activity in the occupied territories in these areas. Hamas has benefited greatly from the infrastructure the Brotherhood has built in these areas to expand its mass base; on the social front, the Muslim Brotherhood has established Islamic charities and kindergartens, which are often attached to the mosques they supervised. They also set up libraries and sports clubs in the neighborhoods. Such associations have spread throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Zakat committees were also established in these regions at the initiative of the Muslim Brotherhood or sympathetic Islamists. In the Gaza Strip, the Islamic Academy, founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in the early seventies, has become one of the most important centers with extensive social activity. This complex has overseen and continues to oversee many other activities and bodies, including the Islamic University of Gaza, which is controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood (and later Hamas).
Hamas, and before it the Muslim Brotherhood, organized trips, especially among university students, and visits to the Al-Aqsa Mosque. It also commemorated Islamic occasions, supported efforts of social solidarity in its various forms, carried out social reform processes, in addition to efforts to spread the Islamic call and spread the Islamic religious climate in the occupied territories. The mosque, in particular, was one of the most important mechanisms of social and political activity, as it provided a meeting point and a permanent and regular mechanism for various forms of activity, in addition to being a place of worship. [13] Hamas has benefited from the associations, institutions, and other methods of work it supervises to spread its ideas, recruit supporters and sympathizers, and thus expand its social and political influence in the occupied territory.
In its political activity, Hamas continued to use the methods of work used by the Muslim Brotherhood before, such as holding political seminars and festivals, holding Islamic exhibitions, especially on Palestinian university campuses, issuing statements, leaflets and booklets, commemorating martyrs and Islamic facts, and holding demonstrations, strikes and other forms of protest. After the outbreak of the intifada, Hamas added to its political activity other forms, represented in the various activities it carried out during the intifada.
Hamas’s Role in the Intifada
Despite rumors by Hamas’s rivals that the movement was forced to participate in the intifada, and that this participation came late, and despite the movement’s claim that it was the initiator and pioneer of the intifada, the fact of the matter is that Hamas participated in the intifada and its activities on an equal footing with the PLO factions. Because Hamas is larger than other factions (except Fatah), its participation has been regular, broad, and multiple; Hamas, like Fatah, has a physical presence throughout the occupied territory and can rely on this presence to sustain the intifada. Because of this presence, repeated arrests of Hamas supporters have not disrupted its participation in the intifada.
There is no doubt that Hamas’ role in the intifada was one of the most important factors for its continuation, due to the expansion of the mass movement and its ability to move and carry out various activities, including the use of firearms against Israeli military targets, which constituted another kind of escalation of confrontations with the Israeli occupation forces. Hamas’s ability to absorb Israeli strikes exceeded that of other forces involved in the intifada. Hamas’ lack of participation in the political process, the Madrid peace conference, and subsequent negotiations helped the movement devote itself to the activities of the intifada. Hamas’ role in the intifada was not affected by the difference of opinion and the recalculation and strategies of the factions participating in the negotiations. Hamas has benefited from its lack of involvement and its focus on the situation in the occupied territories to highlight its role in the intifada.
In addition to the usual activities of the intifada, Hamas was the most engaged in armed actions against Israeli targets. This has earned them more admiration and support among the public, whose hopes for a peaceful solution to the conflict can be reached through ongoing negotiations are beginning to be dashed.
Hamas’ goal in continuing the activities of the intifada and trying to escalate it was not only to strike the Israeli occupation, but also to embarrass the parties involved in the negotiations, and to draw attention to the existence of a major Palestinian force that cannot be ignored and cannot reach agreements with Israel behind its back or despite it.
In any case, Hamas, by participating in the intifada and making sacrifices, is establishing for itself and for the Islamic movement in general a historical jihadist asset or heritage that will inspire generations of Muslims in Palestine and elsewhere. This achievement in itself may be sufficient from Hamas’s point of view if, under the current circumstances, and given the existing balances, it cannot achieve more than that.
Hamas Popularity
In the absence of free and direct democratic elections, it is not possible to determine conclusively the size of Hamas, the extent of its influence, its reach, or its popularity in the Palestinian street, compared to the PLO factions. However, it is possible to point out some criteria by which it is possible to relatively recognize Hamas’s popularity and popularity. These criteria include:
(1) Participation in the activities of the intifada: this participation reflects the movement’s presence throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and reflects the outcome of its activities as the largest political force in the occupied territory, after Fatah.
(2) The number of prisoners and detainees in Israeli prisons and detention centers on charges of belonging to Hamas. Various estimates indicate that the number of these people is second only to the number of prisoners and detainees who are supporters of Fatah.
(3) Hamas’s political impact and moral presence: this movement, as well as the smaller and less numerous Islamic Jihad, can call for a general strike and receive a response from the masses. It is doubtful that any single PLO faction (except Fatah) would receive a similar response to commit to a full-scale strike throughout the West Bank and Gaza.
(4) The change in the Palestinian national political discourse, as this change reflects the national perception of the growing Islamic influence and the role of Islam as an effective factor in attracting the masses. For example, there is an increasing use by PLO supporters of religious expressions and references and the mention of Quranic verses in publications and statements issued by the unified national leadership or affiliated factions. It should be noted here that the pro-OIC nationalist trend ran in the Nablus Chamber of Commerce elections in May 1992 under the name “Muslim National Trend”.
(5) Tendency towards conservatism. Those who follow the movement of Palestinian society from before the intifada until the present notice a tendency towards more conservativeness in the field of behavior and social relations. Such a situation has helped to foster the Islamic religious climate, which has also been reinforced by the oppression, threats and plight of large segments of the masses of the occupied territory. Usually, in such situations, religion is resorted to as a last resort. After the organization’s factions moved away from the circulation of ideological and revolutionary proposals, and their orientation towards realism and political pragmatism, the field became open for the Islamic proposal to fill the ideological and ideological vacuum resulting from such a transformation.
(6) Sectoral elections: The results of the elections of institutions, professional associations, student councils and chambers of commerce indicate the growing popularity of Hamas. When viewed in those elections, in which Hamas did not win, it is noticeable that the movement received between 35% and 45% of the vote. In these elections, the movement wins more votes than any PLO faction except Fatah. In some elections, Hamas defeated Fatah, even when Fatah was allied with other factions, as in the 1992 elections for the Chamber of Commerce in Ramallah, or in the student council elections at the universities of Gaza and Hebron. However, more national institutions, professional associations, chambers of commerce, and student councils are controlled by PLO supporters than similar bodies controlled by Hamas.
When talking about sectoral elections, the electoral system must be taken into account. According to the electoral system followed in most institutions in the occupied territory, the percentage of votes received by a given trend does not translate into an equal proportion of seats in elected councils. In the 1992 Nablus Chamber of Commerce elections, for example, the Islamic Bloc won three of the twelve seats, while winning 45 percent of the vote. The same thing happened when the Islamic Bloc won more than 40 percent of the vote in the student council elections at An-Najah University in 1992, but did not win any of the council seats.
Conclusion
In terms of popular sympathy, Hamas has benefited greatly from being in the opposition position and not being responsible for any failures faced by those in the position of “authority”, the PLO that is seen as the government of the Palestinian people. If Hamas remains in its current state, or if it takes the lead, it will have to prove its worth and ability to meet the national needs of the Palestinian people, both short-term and long-term. It will also be required to demonstrate that it can publicly achieve its interim goals (ending the occupation) or the strategy (establishing an Islamic state in Palestine) in order to gain support and legitimacy and be a convincing alternative to the PLO. It is not yet clear or certain that it will be more likely than the PLO to achieve its goals, at least in the foreseeable future.
The present and future of the Movement will be affected by local, regional and international developments that may enhance or weaken the Movement’s position. The movement must first maintain its unity inside and outside the occupied territory, and seek closer ties with other Palestinian Islamist groups. Hamas must also ensure high-level support from other Islamist movements outside Palestine. It also needs to continue its activities against the occupation if it wants to increase its influence and retain its privileged position in the occupied territory. Its present and future will also be affected by the PLO’s ability to preserve the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and to move towards the realization of these rights represented in the right to self-determination, the establishment of an independent State and the exercise of the right of return. Any failure of the organization will automatically translate into popular gain for Hamas.
On the other hand, Hamas will have to confront and accommodate Israel’s harsh measures against it. There is no doubt that the deportation campaign against a large number of the movement’s leaders and activists in December will negatively affect its organizational strength in the foreseeable future, although this measure enhances the movement’s moral and political standing in the occupied territory.
Finally, the biggest challenge facing the movement lies in its ability or inability to mobilize its Islamic depth outside Palestine, represented by other Islamist movements and forces, and convince it to participate in confronting Israel, because solving the Palestinian issue is an Islamic solution that requires, in the words of one prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, “the mobilization of the Islamic nation.”
